India’s ambitions to build a credible indigenous fighter aircraft fleet have been tested for decades. The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, launched in the 1980s, was meant to free India from dependence on foreign suppliers. Yet, after decades of development, the story of the Tejas still reflects the formidable challenges of defence aviation. Now, the second iteration of the project, the LCA Mk2, faces growing uncertainty. Initially scheduled for its prototype rollout in the mid-2020s, the timeline has already slipped to 2027 and could realistically drift further into the next decade, or perhaps even stall before reaching full production.
The reasons are both technical and geopolitical. Designing a modern combat aircraft is far more than creating a sleek airframe. It requires mastery of fly-by-wire systems, aerodynamics, weapons integration, engines, and stealth technology — areas in which India is still finding its footing. The Tejas Mk2, with its ambitious design, faces obstacles that could stretch development well beyond expectations.
The Canard Challenge and Fly-by-Wire Complexity
The Tejas Mk2 introduces canard foreplanes to improve manoeuvrability and payload performance. On paper, canards promise better aerodynamics and control authority. In practice, however, they pose immense programming challenges for the fly-by-wire (FBW) system — the digital brain that keeps inherently unstable aircraft safely in flight.
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India has limited experience in designing sophisticated FBW systems from scratch. The Mk1 Tejas required significant time merely to achieve acceptable stability without canards. With Mk2, the integration of canards transforms the aircraft’s aerodynamic profile into one of deliberate instability. This requires the FBW system to make countless adjustments per second, and designing such a responsive and reliable system is a herculean task.
History provides cautionary lessons. The Dassault Rafale and Saab Gripen, both incorporating advanced FBW, took over a decade of iterative design and refinement before reaching stable, production-ready systems. Even then, updates and software modifications continued well into their service lives. For India, without that legacy of decades-long experience, it is realistic to assume that programming and fine-tuning the Mk2’s FBW could take more than ten years. Each design alteration — often unavoidable in such projects — adds years of delay.
Weapons Integration: A Long Road Ahead
Designing the airframe is only the beginning. A modern fighter must be a versatile weapons platform, capable of carrying and deploying a wide range of missiles, guided bombs, and electronic warfare systems. For the Tejas Mk2, weapons integration poses another serious challenge.
Every new missile or weapon alters the aerodynamic behaviour of the aircraft. Each change requires recalibration of the FBW system to maintain stability and performance. This is not a matter of weeks or months; it is a painstaking process of simulation, flight testing, and iterative adjustment. Experts estimate that simply integrating a broad suite of weapons could consume half a decade or more, even if the FBW is mature. For India, still working through the basics of canard-based stability, this task could stretch far longer.
The risk is clear: by the time the Mk2 is fully armed and ready, the aircraft may already be outdated compared to global peers.
The Engine Dilemma and Geopolitical Risks
Another persistent obstacle lies under the hood: the engine. India has long struggled to develop a reliable indigenous jet engine. The Kaveri project never met its thrust requirements, forcing the Tejas Mk1 to rely on imported engines. The Mk2 is planned to use the General Electric F414 engine, but here geopolitics intrudes.
India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil during ongoing geopolitical tensions has irked the United States. Should relations sour further, Washington could restrict the supply of critical technologies, including jet engines and integration assistance. Without access to such components, the Mk2 project could grind to a halt. Developing an indigenous alternative would take decades, given India’s limited track record in engine technology. This dependency exposes the Mk2 to geopolitical vulnerabilities beyond the control of Indian designers.
Why Tejas Mk2 May Never See Full Production
Taken together — the FBW complexities, weapons integration hurdles, and engine uncertainty — the future of the Tejas Mk2 looks precarious. Delays until 2030 or beyond appear increasingly probable, and full production may never materialise. The aircraft risks becoming another drawn-out prototype programme rather than a mainstay of the Indian Air Force (IAF).
In a rapidly evolving security environment, where China is fielding fifth-generation stealth fighters and Pakistan is modernising with Chinese support, India cannot afford to wait decades for an uncertain platform.
A Case for Focusing on Tejas Mk1A
Instead of pursuing the Mk2 at all costs, India could consider redirecting its efforts towards the Tejas Mk1A, a proven design already in limited production. By incrementally upgrading the Mk1A — for example, slightly enlarging the airframe to allow greater fuel capacity and weapons carriage — India could achieve many of the same operational benefits that Mk2 promises, but with fewer risks.
Such a modified Mk1A could even step into the role of replacing the ageing Mirage 2000 fleet, a task that Mk2 was expected to fulfil. Unlike the Mk2, the Mk1A’s systems are already stabilised, and expanding its size while retaining its basic configuration avoids the aerodynamic upheaval of canards. In short, this path would deliver results faster, with lower technical and political risks.
Prioritising the AMCA: India’s Fifth-Generation Bet
Ultimately, India’s long-term airpower edge will not be defined by the Tejas Mk2 but by the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), its planned fifth-generation stealth fighter. This programme deserves increased funding and accelerated timelines.
Focusing national resources on the AMCA allows India to leapfrog into technologies that will dominate future warfare: stealth shaping, radar-absorbing materials, advanced sensor fusion, and next-generation weapon systems. Unlike the incremental challenges of Mk2, the AMCA represents a true step-change in capability, directly comparable to aircraft like the F-35 or China’s J-20.
Investing in stealth materials research, engine development in collaboration with trusted partners, and weapon system integration for the AMCA will provide a far greater payoff than struggling with the Mk2’s canard-FBW complexities. In essence, every rupee diverted from the Mk2 into the AMCA hastens India’s arrival in the league of true aerospace powers.
Conclusion
The dream of the Tejas Mk2 was to provide India with a home-grown medium-weight fighter, bridging the gap between the Mk1A and the future AMCA. Yet reality suggests otherwise. The challenges of canard aerodynamics, fly-by-wire programming, weapons integration, and engine procurement may delay the project into the 2030s or prevent it from reaching maturity altogether.
Rather than pursuing a technically and politically vulnerable project, India could gain more by enhancing the Tejas Mk1A and pouring resources into the AMCA stealth fighter. By doing so, it can address immediate gaps in capability while positioning itself for long-term air superiority.
The lesson is clear: in aviation, ambition must be tempered by realism. For India, realism may mean admitting that the Tejas Mk2 is a bridge too far — and that the real future lies in scaling up what already works, while investing heavily in the technologies of tomorrow.